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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART K
BRONX PARK PHASE II PRESERVATION LLC

L&T Index No.: 040737/2018

Petitioner,
DECISION/ORDER

-against BABA SAKANOKO
Respondents 1
Address:

2000 Valentine Avenue
Apt 204
Bronx, New York 10457

Recitat ion, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers con sidered in 1~eview
of Respondent's Motion.
PAPERS
Respondent's Notice of Motio n;
Attorney Affirmatio n; Affida vit in
Suppor t; Memor a ndum of Law; &
Exhibits ("A" - "H ")
Petitioner's Afffrma tion in Opposition
& Exhibits (" l " - "5")
Respondent's Memor andum of La w in
Reply Affirmation & Exhibit ·'A"

NUMBERED
11 2, 3, 4, 5

6, 7
7, 8

Upon the foregoj ng cited papers, the Decision an d Order on Respondent's Motion is
as follows:
BACKGROUND

Bronx Park Phase II Preservation LLC (''Petitioner") commenced the within
summary holdover proceeding against Ba ba Sakanoko ("Respondent") seeking
possession of 1971 Webster Avenue, Apartment 7E, Bronx, New York 10457 (''the
subject premises") on the grou nd that the Respondent viola ted a substantial
obligation of his tenancy. Specifically. Petitionel' asserts that Respondent's lease
included a conditional limitation which provided for its early termination where the
Respondent failed to ma intain his Section 8 benefits t hrough the CVR New York
Westchester HCV Program. 'l'he p1·edicate notices a nd the facts contained therein

assert that the Respondent triggered this conditional limitation when he was
terminated from the Section 8 Program. Petitioner further asserts that it had a
business and/or economic reason constituting good cause to terminate Respondent's
tenancy in t hat his failure to maintain the Section 8 benefits resulted in a loss of
renta l income for the Petitioner.
Respondent, represented by counsel. moves to dismiss the instant proceeding
pursuant to CPLR § 32 11 (a)(l) a nd (a)(7) as well as pursua nt to CPLR § 3212.
Respondent asserts that this proceeding should be dismissed as the grou nds of this
holdover proceeding have been cured. For the reasons cited below, Respondent's
motion is DENIED.

THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION
Respondent's Section 8 benefits from the CVR New York Westchester HCV Program
(hereinafter "CVR") were terminated on November 30, 2017. The termination was
based upon the Respondent's purported violation of his familial obligations under
HUD Regulations 24 CFR 982.551. In at least one notice to the Res pondent, CVR
asse1ted th at the Respondent "failed to provide truthful and complete
in for mation/documentation req uired to complete an annual/interim recertification
as requested on 9/7 /17, 9/19/1 7, & 10/4/17" . 1 It is undisputed that Respondent's
Jease included a co nditional limitation which provided for its early termination
where the Respondent failed to maintain his Section 8 benefits through CVR. It is
this conditional limitation which forms one of at least two discernable claims upon
which the Petitioner h as predicated t his holdover proceeding. It is further
undisputed that Respondent's Section 8 subsidy was thereafter reinstated during
the pendency of this holdover proceeding. Although the restoration was effective
Febr uary 1, 2019, it did not include a ny retroactive payments to the Petitioner for
the time period that the Respondent was terminated from th e program: a period of
approximately fourteen (14) mont hs.2
Respondent now asserts in his moving papers that the eviction remedy herein
sought by the Petitioner does not lie since Respondent's Section 8 subsidy was
restored. Petitioner stands in opposition. It asserts that the Respondent has not
cured all claims alleged in the predicate notices. Petitioner avers that it ha d an
addjtional basis for terminating Respondent's tenancy. That basis, pursuant to 24
CFR 982.310 (d)(l)(iv), allows a landlord to terminate a tenancy for good cause
where there is •·a business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy." The
business or economic reason is explained in the predicate notices as a loss of rental
income from the Section 8 subsidy: an a mount which is said to be $27,437.
1

2

Peti tioner's Exhibit "5"
Responde nt's Exhibit "B" and "C"
2

Respondent replies to this claim by stating that it cannot b mandated to pay the
Section 8 portion of the rent.
The issue which now con cerns this Court is whether the Petitioner has a cause of
action pursuant to 24 CFR 982.310 (d)(l)(iv) for the lost rental income from the
ection 8 subs idy during the time period for which the Respondent was terminated
from the Section 8 program. Especially, where. as here. the Respondent's Section 8
subsidy was reinstated during the pendency of this proceeding. This Court is of the
opinion that Petitioner still has a viable claim.

It is well-established precedent that a "Section 8 tenant agrees in the Section 8
lease only Lo pay the tenant s hare of the rent. AbsenL a s howing by [a] landlord of a
new agrcw mcnt ... a Section 8 tenant does not bccom ) liable for the Section 8 s hare
of t he r ent ns 'rent' even after termination of th<? s ubs idy." (Vinccnzi v St.1:·ong, 16
Misc 3d 1121 [AJ !Civ Ct, Bronx County 2007, Mndhavan, J.], quoting P1·ospect
Pince HDFC v Gnildon, 6 Misc 3d 135 [A] [1st De pt 2005)). I t is thi s precisely this
prohibition which provides one part of the foundation for Petitionet·'s claim.
Petitioner here has suffered a significant econom ic loss in the sum of 27.437 as a
resu lt of th unpoid Section 8 benefits which accrued during t h e period t hat
Respondent was terminated from the program. Petitioner cannot recover this sum
fro m the Respondent in a nonpayment proceeding as there is no agreement
obligating the Respondent to pay any sum in excess of her tenant share and, absent
such agreement. any claim would be prohibited by fedcl'al low and regulations
governing HAP contracts as well as the case law interpreting the sa me. Nor can
Petitioner seemingly recover from CVR given the apparent. propriety of CVR's
determination in terminating Respondent's subsidy.

Th e loss of the St ction 8 portion of the rent cannot be the sole basis for a claim
undet' 24 CFH 982.310 (d)(l )(iv) (see ge11e1·ally 24 CFR 982.310 [b][2)). The other
in tegra l pioce for such a claim requires a wrongful act on t he part of the tenant
which resulted in the underlying termination of the subsidy. The Appellate Term
holding in 53·6~ Pnrtne1·s, L.P. v Paez. which the R espon dent cites in his papers,
does not ca ll for a different result (63 Misc 3d 158 [A] (App Term 1st Dept 2019]). In
53-63 Partners, L.P. v Paez, the Appellate Term affirmed a lower cou rt ruling which
dismissed a holdover proceeding on a tenant's motion which establish ed by
documentary evide nce that the Section 8 subs idy was reinstated. The Appellate
Term reached its holding by citing to a n earlier decision by the Term in DU 1st
Realty Co. LP v Robinson.·1 This earlier ruling similarly held that a holdover
eviction proceeding was not available as a remedy to a landlord where the tenant's
S ction subsidy was reinstated. This eru·Jier decision from the Appellate Term was
1

3

35 Misc 3d 138 IAJ [App 'T'erm lsl Dept. 20 12)
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reached with one important qualificat ion. The ruling held that such claims lacked
viability in t hose instance where it could not be shown that the tenant's termination
from the program was a purposeful act on the part of the tenant (35 Misc 3d 138 [A]
[App Term 1st Dept 2012]).
In the case at bar, Respondent failed to eliminate a triable issue of fact concerning
the nature of his termination and whether such termination was a result of his
wrongful and purposeful actions. CVR requested the following documents from the
Respondent in the notices leading up to his termination: a) Four (4) current and
consecutive pay stubs from Fatimata's4 employment at Starbucks; b) an SSI award
letter for Abubakar; c) a self-employment certificate; d) a Bank of America bank
statements from the Respondent for the period of J uly 1 - Ju ly 31; and e) school
records for Fatimata indicating her status as a full-time student .
In CVR's fi naJ notice before resorting to termination of Respondent's subsidy, the
agency acknowledged receipt of th e SSI award letter and t he Bank of America bank
statement. The remaining three documents demands were alleged to be
outstanding. Respondent asserts in his affidavit that he faxed the requested
documents to CVR on or about Octobel' 11, 2017°: or some five (5) days before the
ultimate deadlin e set by CVR. Respondent's assertion, however, th at it was agency
error which resulted in the termination of his subsidy is un supported by t he record.
Nor do t he annexed records eliminate the possibility that Respondent's own act ions
contributed to the termination of the subsidy. First, had the agency improperly
terminated Respondent's benefits, Respondent had every administrative appeal at
his disposal as well as t he option of initiating an Article 78 proceeding to annul the
termination of his subsidy. Respondent failed to exercise those remedies.
Irrespective of this deficiency, the exhibits which Respondent annexed as proof that
he timely complied with CVR's final request contradicts his own claim that it was
agency enor. On or abou t October 11, 20 17, Respondent asserts that he faxed a ll of
the requisite documents to CVR. The submission, however, only contains school
records for Respondent's six children . The submission did not include any selfemployment certificate or, as Respondent claims in his affidavit, proof of his
unemployment. Nor did it include any information pertaining to "Fatimata's"
employment at Starbucks. Documents which the agency requested in all of its
notices prior to termination.
The documents submitted to CVR on October 11, 2017 are disconcerting and also
raise the possibility t hat Respondent was engaging in a purposeful act to hide
household income so as to prevent the agency from setting Respondent's share of
• Fatimata is the name provi ded in all of the notices sent by CVR
5 Respondent annexes his s ubmission to CVR as Exhibit "E" to the moving papers
G Respondent's Exhibit ''E"
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the rent at a higher amount. Respondent submitted school records for all six of his
children on October 11 , 2017 even though the agency only requested records 7 for
"Fatimata." Upon scrutinizing the su bmission annexed to Respondent's moving
papers, the school records for five of his six children were dated between October 3,
2017 and October 6, 2017 or for the current school year. A school record for the
remaining child, Fatmata, was dated October 13, 2016 or for the preceding school
year. Federal regulations specify the amounts which are to be included in the
calculation of annual income for the purpose of determining the total tenant
payment for the housing choice voucher program. Earnings in excess of $480 for
each full-time student, 18 years or older, are to be excluded from the annual income
of the household.a Since Fatmata would have been 19 years old at the time of
recertification, there is a serious question concerning Respondent's actions and
whether he engaged in a purposeful act which was intended to obfuscate CVR's
ability to ascertain whether Fatmata was enrolled as a full-time student.
Especially, in light of the additional sub missions from the other children which
were not germane to the agency's request. Had Respondent failed to establish
Fatmata's status as a full-time student, her income, if any, from employment from
Starbucks9 would have been included to determine Respondent's share of the rent.
Although the agency misspelled the name of Respondent's daughter as "Fatima tail
throughout alJ of its notices, Respondent was seemingly aware that the agency was
referring to Fatmata at all times as she was the only daughter to have been
employed by Starbucks.
Therefore, given the above, Respondent's motion to dismiss the instant proceeding
is hereby denied.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, those prongs of Respondent's motion seeking dismissal are DENIED;
and it is further

7 The agency requested school records as well as records concerning her employment at Sta·rbu cks
a Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook, EXHIBIT 5-2, INCOME EXCLUSIONS, Paragraph
(11) Earnings in excess of $480 for each full-time student 18 years or older (excluding the head of
household and
spouse}
9 Although Respondent asset·ts that be submitted proof to CVR that Fatmata was terminated from
employment at Starbucks, Respondent failed to annex proof of the same to the moving papers.
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ORDERED, thnt this proceeding is restored to the Cout·t's calendar on March 16.
2020 at 9:30 a.m. in Part K. Room 350 for all purposes, including trial.
This constitutes the Decision/Order of this Court.

Dated:

Bronx, New York
Febt·ua1·y 7, 2020

HON. KRZYSZTOF LACH
Judge, Housing Court
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